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REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Appellant respectfully submits the following brief 
responding to Appellees' Brief. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The statement of facts previously submitted by Appellants, 
as supplemented by reference to Appellees' brief is adequate to 
support the arguments set forth herein. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO FIND THAT 
PLAINTIFFS' CLAIMS AGAINST DEFENDANTS ARE BARRED BY THE 
DOCTRINE OF RES JUDICATA 
Throughout their brief, Plaintiffs/Appellees have attempted 
to obscure the concept of issue preclusion by injecting totally 
irrelevant facts and legal concepts. References to the second 
corporate entity, referred to earlier as "NUF 2" are totally 
irrelevant. Although NUF 2 is clearly a new party to the second 
case, Appellees' implication that this entity has any rights 
under the June 15, 1990 contract is without merit. If NUF 2 had 
any rights to assert in the action, those rights would only 
derive through assignment from NUF 1. 
Plaintiffs/Appellees further imply that the fact that they 
named the Limited Liability Company as a new party defendant 
defeats the requirement that the parties must be the same or in 
privy with those in the prior litigation. The Berry court citing 
Robertson v. Campbell, 694 P.2d at 123 0 (Utah 1983) makes it 
clear that it is not necessary for a defendant who claims 
collateral estoppel against a party who earlier lost the issue to 
have been a party to that same action. Berry v. Berry, 738 P.2d 
246 (Utah App. 1987) Specifically citing Food for Health Company 
v. 3839 Joint Venture, 129 Ariz. 103, 628 P.2d 986, 990-991 
(1981) the court states that... 
The defensive use of collateral estoppel, 
used to preclude re-litigation of a claim, 
occurs when a party defending a claim 
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attempts to assert a previous judgment, to 
which it was not a party, against an opponent 
who was a party. In effect, once a party has 
had his day in court and loses, he does not 
get a second chance, against a different 
party, on the same claim, (emphasis in 
original) 
Clearly, the claims by NUF 1, NUF 2 and Paul Gardner all 
arise under the NUF-Madsen contract, which was previously 
litigated in front of Judge Frederick. 
A. Claim of Rights by Subsequent Corporation. 
To begin with, the corporations (NUF 1 and NUF 2) are 
creatures of statute, and have only the rights conferred to them 
by statute, and then only so long as they conform with the 
statutory requirements for their existence. The facts of this 
case are uncontested that NUF 1 was involuntarily dissolved by 
the Corporation Division on May 1, 1990. Under the law it ceased 
to exist as of that date, except for very limited rights to "wind 
down" conferred upon it by statute. 
On the other hand, NUF 2 did not exist prior to October 12, 
1993, when it was admittedly incorporated. It had no rights nor 
powers which predated that event in spite of the self-serving 
statement in the "purpose" section of the Articles of 
Incorporation which purported to carry on the business of the 
prior (NUF 1) corporation. There was a legal void between May 1, 
1990, and October 12, 1993, during which no corporate entity 
existed by the name NUF, Inc. 
The only way in which NUF 2 could possibly have any 
enforceable rights relating back to the earlier entity would be 
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if there had been an indirect assignment of those rights or 
benefits through a third party. Although there was some 
questionable testimony regarding an assignment from NUF 1 to Paul 
Gardner, there was no testimony that Paul Gardner had ever made 
any assignment of his rights to the corporation which was formed 
after the summary judgment by Judge Frederick,1 Similarly, there 
was no testimony of any kind that Paul Gardner had paid any 
consideration for the assignment of rights purportedly held by 
NUF 1 and purportedly transferred to him by oral assignment, nor 
was there any evidence of consideration being paid by NUF 2 to 
Mr. Gardner. 
B. Claim that Judgment was Procedural rather than 
Substantive. 
Plaintiffs/Appellees similarly attempt to create a 
distinction between a procedural and a substantive disposition of 
the first case in order to support an argument that there was no 
final judgment in the first case before Judge Frederick. 
However, the case law does not provide a distinction between 
procedural and substantive orders as Plaintiffs/Appellees have 
attempted to do on the basis of their interpretation of the case 
of Jones, Waldo, Holbrook & McDonough v. Dawson, 2 98 Utah Adv. 
lrThe only testimony available on this issue was from 
Plaintiffs. The evidence which they produced at trial was 
testimony from Mr. Gardner and his wife that there had been an oral 
assignment of rights from NUF 1 to Mr. Gardner at a Board of 
Director's meeting which was attended by them and Clayton 
Wilkinson. (TT1:P123,124 and TT1: P188, 189) Mr. Wilkinson 
subsequently filed an affidavit with the court stating that he had 
never attended any directors meeting with Gardners. See Affidavit 
of Clayton Wilkinson in Opposition to Defendant's Motion for New 
Trial, at P.2. 
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Rep. 8 (1996). In the earlier case of Berry v. Berry, 738 P.2d 
246 (Utah App. 1987) this Court citing Copper State Thrift & Loan 
v. Bruno, 735 P.2d 390 (Utah App. 1987) and StoII v. Gottlieb, 
305 U.S. 165, 59 S.Ct. 134, 83 L.Ed. 104 (1938) specifically 
addressed the question "Was there a final judgment on the 
merits?" (emphasis in original). Id. at 249. In response to that 
question, this Court stated that "a judgment or order is final 
for purposes of collateral estoppel until reversed on appeal, 
modified or set aside in the court of rendition." The Court 
makes no distinction whatsoever as to whether the merits deal 
with procedural or substantive issues. 
In support of this argument, Plaintiffs argue that no issues 
other than "standing" were before Judge Frederick. This argument 
is similarly misdirected for two reasons. On the summary 
judgment their entire complaint, and any legal or factual support 
to sustain that complaint was before the court. (See Appendix A 
of Addendum) In fact, under the rules for determining summary 
judgments all inferences were made in favor of 
Plaintiffs/Appellees as the non-moving party. However, more 
importantly, as set forth in the Berry case above, the test is 
not what was actually before the court, but what could have been 
put before the court. Id. at 249. In the matter of D'Aston v. 
Aston, 844 P.2d 345, (Utah App. 1992) this Court quoted 
Throckmorton and a line of preceding cases in setting forth the 
criteria for a claim to be barred by res judicata. The second of 
those criteria reads as follows: 
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(2 the claim that is asserted to be barred must have 
been presented or be such that it could have been 
presented in the first case; D'Aston at 350. 
Under this criteria, if there were any merit to Appellees' 
allegations of an assignment from NUF 1 to Mr. Gardner, then that 
claim could certainly have been raised in the case before Judge 
Frederick. The fact that Plaintiffs/Appellees failed to do so in 
the first action does not entitle them to a second bite at the 
apple. 
C. The Parties to the Second Case Were Not Identical to 
Those in the First. 
Finally, Plaintiffs/Appellees claim that issue preclusion 
does not bar the second case because the parties to the second 
action were different from those in the first action. However, 
the correct test for parties is not that they be identical, but 
that they must be either a party to, privy to or an assignee of a 
party to the first case. Kunz & Co. v. State, 913 P.2d 765 at 
769 (Utah App. 1996), citing D'Aston v. Aston, 844 P.2d 345, 350 
(Utah App. 1992) . The evidence before the court in this case is 
clearly that Paul Gardner was the moving party in both actions. 
He was the president of NUF 1, and the president of NUF 2. 
Testimony at the trial was that NUF and several other 
corporations were "his companies".2 (TT1:P118-120) Finally, at 
trial both Mr. and Mrs. Gardner claimed that Paul Gardner was the 
assignee of any rights held by NUF 1 in the contract with 
Paragraph 2 of Appellees' statement of facts stated that 
"While Mr. Gardner listed NUF, Inc. as the title holder, he 
considered himself (as owner of NUF, Inc.) as the owner of the 
boat." 
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Defendants Madsen. In the case of Kunz & Co. v. State, this 
Court found that Kunz, as assignee of the rights of a non-related 
third party assignor, was bound by the earlier decision by the 
Utah Department of Transportation. Id. at 769. If the doctrine 
applies to such an arms length transaction as that in Kunz, it 
should certainly apply to circumstances where the actual party 
involved in both cases is the same Paul Gardner. 
In the case of Berry v. Berry above, under circumstances 
analogous to those in the present case, this Court found that 
"the record indicates that the parties have had fair notice of 
the previous action and an opportunity to appear before the 
appropriate tribunals...to present their arguments. If Appellant 
failed to fully raise her arguments...it was not because she did 
not have [the] opportunity to do so." Id at 249, 250. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT CONTRARY TO THE 
CLEAR AND UNAMBIGUOUS LANGUAGE OF THE WRITTEN CONTRACT, 
PLAINTIFF PAUL GARDNER RATHER THAN NUF, INC. HAD A 
CONTRACTUAL CLAIM AGAINST DEFENDANTS MADSEN 
In attacking Appellants' Point II, Plaintiff argues that 
Appellants failed to marshall facts regarding that contract. 
However, as set forth in Appellants' brief, the issue is whether 
the contract was ambiguous, thereby authorizing the court to go 
beyond the four corners of the document. As set forth in 
Appellants' brief, the contract is not ambiguous as to the 
parties to the contract, and the testimony at the trial from Paul 
Gardner was that he had made the changes to the contract which 
deleted references to him personally and to his wife, and that he 
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had signed on behalf of the buyer as "NUF, Inc. by Paul Gardner" 
(Pi. Exh. 11: Def. Exh. 2) The meaning is clear and unambiguous. 
As the Supreme Court stated in the matter of Ephraim Theater Co. 
v. Hawk, 321 P.2d 223 (Utah 1958): 
"the understanding thus expressed is plain 
and provides no justification for a finding 
based upon conduct..." Id. at 167, fn. 2. 
This Court can decide as a matter of law whether that contract 
was so ambiguous as to require the admission of parol evidence to 
determine the meaning and intent of the parties. It was 
Plaintiffs who defined the party as NUF, Inc. and they should not 
be allowed to modify the contract at the later date, by parol 
evidence, to the detriment of Defendants/Appellants. 
POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO APPLY THE PROPER 
LAW TO THE UNDISPUTED FACTS THAT THE CORPORATE 
PLAINTIFF HAD BEEN DISSOLVED PRIOR TO ENTRY INTO THE 
CONTRACT AND THAT THE CONTRACT OR ANY ATTEMPT TO ASSIGN 
RIGHTS UNDER THAT CONTRACT WAS THEREFORE VOID 
Appellees again attempt to characterize Appellants' point as 
an attack on the factual determination made by the trial court. 
This is incorrect. The uncontroverted facts before the court 
were that NUF 1 was dissolved on May 1, 1990 and that it 
purported to enter into the contract with Madsens on June 15, 
1990. In reality, there is no possible factual determination 
that can be made by the trial court which supports 
Plaintiffs/Appellees arguments that any rights were assigned from 
NUF 1 to Plaintiff Paul Gardner. Granted the court did not make 
a finding, nor was there any testimony as to the date that the 
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purported assignment took place. However, if the assignment took 
place before June 15, 1990, even assuming that this Court ignores 
the argument that there was no consideration nor was the 
attempted assignment in writing, there were in fact no rights 
under any contract with Madsens which existed at that time which 
could have been assigned to Mr. Gardner. On the other hand, if 
the assignment was made at any time after May 1, 1990, then the 
assignment would be void, as a matter of law, since the assignor 
did not exist. If the purported assignment took place between 
May 1, 1990 and June 15, 1990, then both exclusions would apply 
and the net result would be a non-entity assigning non-existent 
rights. 
By the same token, although Plaintiff argues that there was 
"unobjected to evidence that Paul Gardner had a personal interest 
in the boat" (Plaintiffs/Appellees' brief at page 13), that 
argument totally ignores the fact that any rights that anyone had 
to the houseboat, which was undisputedly previously owned by 
Madsens, would have to be by contract. The only contract which 
transferred any interest in the boat was the written contract 
between NUF 1 and Madsens. There was simply no other evidence 
before the trial court as to any other contract. Until 
Plaintiffs can show that the signed contract is ambiguous, any 
evidence regarding Mr. Gardner's participation or usage is 
irrelevant. 
Finally, at page 15 of Appellees' brief, Plaintiffs argue 
for the first time the concept of ratification of the contract. 
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However, that argument ignores the fact that even if Madsens did 
intend to ratify the original contract, unless that contract was 
modified to provide that Paul Gardner was a party, the 
ratification would be with a non-existent entity. 
POINT IV 
THE TRIAL ERRED IN ASSESSING INAPPROPRIATE DAMAGES 
BASED UPON THE FULL VALUE OF 3 0% OF THE TOTAL PRIME 
USAGE WHEN PLAINTIFFS HAD PURCHASED ONLY 10% OWNERSHIP 
IN THE ENTITY, FAILED TO ACCOUNT FOR THE VALUE OF NON-
PEAK WHICH HAD BEEN EFFECTIVELY CONVERTED TO PEAK 
"SUMMER" WEEKS, AND IN DETERMINING THAT THE 
SUBSEQUENTLY FORMED LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY WAS 
RESPONSIBLE FOR ANY DAMAGES TO PLAINTIFF 
Again, Plaintiffs attack this point on the basis that 
Appellants have failed to marshall evidence. However, Appellants 
concede that they have not marshalled all evidence with respect 
to all of the factual findings with which they disagree. To do 
so within the length of limitations of the brief would be 
physically impossible. Appellants did, however, marshall the 
evidence with respect to several key points in order to 
demonstrate to this Court that the issues decided by the trial 
court were far from clear-cut. In fact, it is painfully clear 
that a finder of fact without even a slight interest in the 
outcome might well have decided those factual issues differently. 
The facts provided do directly support Appellants' obligations 
set forth under Point V below. 
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POINT V 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO DISCLOSE THAT HIS 
NEPHEW WAS A PRINCIPAL IN THE PLAINTIFF CORPORATION AND 
A BUSINESS PARTNER OF PLAINTIFF PAUL GARDNER, IN 
FAILING TO RECUSE HIMSELF AND IN FAILING TO GRANT A NEW 
TRIAL BEFORE AN IMPARTIAL JUDGE 
In attacking Appellants' argument with respect to this 
issue, Plaintiffs totally ignore the fact that Clayton Wilkinson 
was a director of NUF 1, the party to the contract with Madsens. 
Although Plaintiffs argue that Clayton Wilkinson has no interest 
in the Plaintiff corporation, has no equity in any Plaintiff, and 
has no equity or other interest in the outcome of the case 
(Appellants' brief at 17), this argument flies in the face of 
reality. Clayton Wilkinson was admittedly a director of the 
corporation (NUF 1) and as such has a fiduciary responsibility to 
the corporate entity and therefore has a significant interest in 
the outcome of the case. 
Plaintiffs argue that Appellants "make no claim that Judge 
Wilkinson's failure to disqualify himself was intentional or 
malicious or that he acted differently than he would have 
otherwise acted" (Appellees' brief at 17). This claim clearly 
distorts the criteria for determining judicial conflict of 
interest. As is set forth in Regional Sales Agency v. Reichart, 
830 P.2d 252, (Utah 1992), the Utah Supreme Court has clearly 
taken the position in its view toward the disqualification of 
judges that there can be no apparent, or appearance of any, 
conflict of interest. As set forth in Appellants' brief, Justice 
Zimmerman spelled out a very stringent test when he stated that 
"...under Canon 3, a relative of the 
requisite degree of relationship has an 
"interest" that might be sufficiently 
"affected by the outcome" of a case in every 
situation where a judge sits on a case in 
which the judge's relative is a partner or 
otherwise an equity participant in a firm 
that represents a party to the case." Id. at 
255. 
The case which Justice Zimmerman was addressing was one in 
which an attorney representing a client, had an interest, thereby 
establishing a conflict of interest with Judge Billings, the 
attorney's daughter-in-law. That situation is even further 
removed from a situation in which the relative is a director of 
the corporation, and a business partner with an individual 
participant in the case. The argument that the "partnership" in 
Probe Realty was not involved in the case does not negate the 
interest that Clayton Wilkinson might have in the outcome of the 
case. If the court applies the "appearance" of any gain, then 
Judge Wilkinson clearly should have disqualified himself. 
Finally, Plaintiffs argue that Appellants failed to object 
to the conflict of interest raised by the relationship to the 
judge at the time of trial. However, as set forth in Appellants' 
original brief, and as documented by the Affidavit of Defendant 
Kenneth Madsen, there was no indication of any sort from the 
judge which might show any recognition or family relationship to 
Mr. Clayton Wilkinson when the name was disclosed at trial. 
Appellants did not discover the family relationship until after 
Defendant Madsen received a telephone call and hired a 
genealogist to look into a possible family relationship. 
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Appellants concede that normally an issue must be preserved 
for appeal by the making of a timely objection at trial. 
However, in the instant case, the parties who were prejudiced by 
the relationship were the only parties to the transaction without 
knowledge of the relationship. Had the trial judge disclosed to 
the parties that there was a family relationship between himself 
and Clayton Wilkinson, then Defendants would have had the 
opportunity to object at the time. However, where the trial 
judge withheld that information, and where plaintiffs made no 
effort to disclose the relationship at trial, then they should be 
estopped from claiming that the objection was not timely made. 
POINT VI 
APPELLANTS SHOULD BE AWARDED ALL OF THEIR COSTS AND 
ATTORNEYS FEES INCURRED IN THE DEFENSE OF THE ACTION 
AT TRIAL AND ON THIS APPEAL 
The matter having been resolved in the first case before 
Judge Frederick, pursuant to § 78-26-56 of the Utah Code 
Annotated (1953, as amended) the action brought by Plaintiffs in 
this matter was, by definition, without merit and should entitle 
Defendants/Appellants to their costs and attorney's fees in the 
underlying action and in this appeal. 
CONCLUSION 
Although Plaintiffs have attempted to obscure the point 
regarding the doctrine of issue preclusion, all of the tests have 
been met, and they should be barred by that doctrine from even 
proceeding with the second case which is the subject of this 
appeal. Similarly, the facts are undisputed that the parties to 
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the NUF-Madsen contract were NUF 1 and Madsens. It is also 
undisputed that NUF 1 was not a legal entity at the time that the 
contract was made, nor when the action was brought to enforce 
that contract. Under such circumstances, Plaintiffs are not 
entitled to enforcement of the contract. Thirdly, even if the 
Court finds that Plaintiff's claims are not barred by the 
doctrine of issue preclusion, and further finds that they do have 
an enforceable claim, then Defendants are entitled to a new trial 
before a disinterested judge. 
Finally, under circumstances where this case was resolved in 
the first action and where the trial court awarded attorney's 
fees to Plaintiffs in this action, Defendants should be awarded 
all of their costs and attorney's fees in defending the second 
action brought by Plaintiffs and in prosecuting this appeal. 
RESPECTFULLY submitted this ^T) day of May, 1997. 
NEIL B. CRIST 
Attorney for Defendants 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the fore-
going document to the following individual at the address shown, 
via first-class mail, postage prepaid on this J£(Q, day of May, 
1997: 
Lowell V. Summerhays 
Attorney at Law 
32 West 6400 South, #101 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107 ZK^^st 
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ADDENDUM 
APPENDIX A: Complaint from original case before Judge 
Frederick 
Lowell V. Summerhays-3154 
ADAMSON & SUMMERHAYS 
6400 Commerce Park 
448 East 6400 South, Suite 314 
Murray, Utah 84107 
Telephone: (801) 262-4495 
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
NUF INC., A Utah 
Corporation 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
KENNETH MADSEN and 
MARILYN MADSEN 
Defendants. 
COMPLAINT 
Civil No. 
Judge: 
The Plaintiff by and though counsel Lowell V. Summerhays of 
the firm of ADAMSON & SUMMERHAYS herewith complains of the 
Defendants and alleges as follows: 
I. 
FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION - BREACH OF CONTRACT 
FOR THE SALE OF TEN PERCENT INTEREST IN 
SUMMERSET CRUISER HOUSEBOAT 
AGAINST BOTH DEFENDANTS 
1. That Nuf, Inc.is a Utah Corporation with its principle 
place of business Salt Lake County, State of Utah. 
2. That Ken Madsen and Marilyn Madsen are residence of Salt 
Lake County, State of Utah. 
3. That the subject matter of this action is a contract 
entered into and performable in Salt Lake County, State of Utah a 
copy of which is annexed hereto, marked Exhibit A and incorporated 
herein by reference. 
4. This court has jurisdiction over the general subject 
matter of this action pursuant to 78-18-23. 
5. Pursuant to the terms of Exhibit A the Plaintiff, NUF 
Corporation had the. right to have utilization of a 62 foot 
Summerset Cruiser houseboat for a total of six weeks of each 
calendar year. The contract was subsequently amended for the 
utilization of seven weeks per year and the provision of paragraph 
one allowing the utilization of a Jet Ski Boat and a Wet Bike 
concurrent with the utilization of the Summerset Cruiser was 
deleted. 
6. The Defendants have consistently since the inception of 
this contract failed and refused to provide the utilization of the 
Summerset Cruiser houseboat in accordance with the terms and 
provision of the contract and have completely breached said 
agreement and have at all times failed and refused the Plaintiff 
the right to use the houseboat with the exception of a few days 
utilization at undesirable times since the date of the contract. 
7. The Defendants have completely breach the contract have 
failed and refused preform and do now fail and refuse to perform in 
particular with the Defendants had promised utilization of the 
c 
houseboat for the week of July 5 through July 11, 1993 dominated as 
the 27th week of the year. Notice was given to the Plaintiff to 
that effect on or about June 25, 1993 after the Plaintiff had made 
full arrangements with its own personal and with friends of the 
owners of Plaintiff for utilization of the houseboat from its 
moorings at Height Marina on Lake Powell to be utilized on Lake 
Powell at considerable inconvenience and lost time and at the 
expense of their friendship and relationship involved therein. 
8. That the Plaintiff is entitled to and order of this court 
rescinding said contract and requiring the Defendants to return to 
the Plaintiff the funds which they paid for the purchase of their 
utilization rights in the houseboat in the amount of Ten Thousand 
Dollars ($10,000.00) plus prejudgment and post judgement interest 
at the highest legal rate. 
9. The agreement provides for payment of attorney fees in 
paragraph 15 which provides in part as follows: 
"In event of any default of under this Agreement, the 
defaulting party agrees to pay reasonable attorney's fees and costs 
of the prevailing party." 
Pursuant to said paragraph the Plaintiff is entitled to a judgement 
against the Defendant for reasonable attorney fees. 
WHEREFORE the Plaintiff prays for judgement against the 
Defendants jointly and separately as follows: 
1. For Ten Thousand Dollars ($10,000.00), 
2. For Prejudgment and post judgment interest at the highest 
legal rate, 
3. For reasonable attorney fees, 
4. For costs of court herein, 
5. For such other relief as the court deems just and proper. 
II ..:• 
SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION 
BREACH OF CONTRACT FOR SALE OF WAVE RUNNERS 
AGAINST KENNETH D. MADSEN ONLY 
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10. The Plaintiff reallege all the allegations set forth in 
paragraphs one through nine. 
11. The Plaintiff entered into a contract with the Defendant, 
Kenneth D. Madsen for the purchase of a fifty percent (50%) 
ownership in three wave runners serial numbers YAM20838J788, 
YAM135141788 and YAM209045191. The basic terms and conditions are 
set forth on page 4 of Exhibit A which is attached hereto and 
incorporated herein by reference. 
12. Pursuant to the terms of the written contract and verbal 
representations and agreements made at the time it was entered 
into, the Plaintiff was entitled to use the three wave runners for 
fifty percent (50%) of the time and has not been able to do so. 
13. The Plaintiff has suffered damages for loss of use of the 
wave runners in the amount of Two Thousand Dollars ($2,000.00) per 
year and therefore has suffered damages in the amount of Four 
Thousand Dollars ($4,000.00) to date. 
14. The Defendant Kenneth Madsen represented and agreed that 
he would sell a fifty percent (50%) interest in the three wave 
runners at his cost. The actual sales price was Four thousand four 
hundred fifty Dollars ($4,450.00) and based upon the information 
and belief the Plaintiff alleges that the cost for fifty percent 
(50%) of the wave runner was less than Four Thousand Four Hundred 
Fifty Dollars ($4,450.00) and seeks from the court an accounting 
from the Defendant of the actual cost and is entitled to a judgment 
against the Defendant to the extent that the cost was less than the 
actual sales price. 
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15. The Defendant, Kenneth Madsen fails and refuses to allow 
the Plaintiff to use the wave runners fifty percent (50%) of the 
time and continues to so and threatens to continue to do so in the 
further. The Plaintiff is entitled to a judgement against the 
Defendant, Kenneth D. Madsen ordering him to allow the Plaintiff to 
exercise his fifty percent (50%) utilization and ownership rights 
in the three wave runners. 
16. The Defendant asserted to the Plaintiff that there is a 
contractual and or legal obligation pursuant to course of dealing 
contract and legal liability of the parties pursuant to which the 
Plaintiff has an obligation to either sell or buy a one half (1/2) 
interest in the three wave runners for Three Thousand Five Hundred 
Dollars ($3,500.00). The Plaintiff is entitle to a declaratory 
judgement from this court determining that no such contractual or 
legal obligation exist. 
17. The agreement is part of page 4 of the contract annexed 
hereto as Exhibit A and the Plaintiff is entitled to the benefits 
of paragraph fifteen of said exhibit A in as much as the contract 
are integrated contracts and the Plaintiff is therefore entitled to 
reasonable attorney fees under the terms and provisions of this 
second cause of action. 
WHEREFORE the Plaintiff prays for judgement against the 
Defendant as follows: 
1. For Four Thousand Dollars damages, 
2. For a declaratory judgment and restraining order and 
injunction heretofore set forth. 
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3. For reasonable attorney fees, 
4. For cost of court herein, 
5. For such other relief as the court deems just and proper. 
III. 
THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION 
COMPLAINT FOR ACCOUNTING ON MAINTENANCE FEES 
AGAINST THE DEFENDANT KENNETH MADSEN 
18. The Plaintiff reasserts and alleges the allegation of 
paragraphs one through nine of the second cause of action and ten 
through seventeen of the second cause of action as through 
specifically set forth herein. 
19. Pursuant to the terms of the agreement, Exhibit A, and 
verbal agreements entered into in connection therewith the 
Plaintiff has been required and induced to pay annual maintenance 
fees for the Summerset Cruiser houseboat and upon information and 
belief alleges that certain fees were requested in connection with 
maintenance of the three wave runners. 
20. The Plaintiff has made the following yearly payments on 
maintenance: 
A. 1990 - Six Hundred Dollars ($600.00) 
B. 1991 _ Twelve Hundred Dollars ($1200.00) 
C. 1992 - Twelve Hundred Dollars (1200.00) 
21. Pursuant to the terms and conditions of the Plaintiff's 
agreement with respect to maintenance he is obligated to be twenty 
percent (20%) of the total maintenance under paragraph 4 of Exhibit 
A which would mean that the remaining eighty percent (80%) of the 
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maintenance would have to be paid by the Defendants and or their 
assigned or designees. 
22. The Plaintiff is entitled to an accounting of the 
maintenance expenses, income, and utilization of the proceeds 
thereof and the court should enter a declaratory judgement and 
order requiring the Defendants to provide said accounting. 
23. If the accounting discloses that the Plaintiff has paid 
a disproportion of the maintenance the Plaintiff is entitled to a 
judgement against the Defendants for the difference. 
24. The Plaintiff are entitled reasonable attorney fees 
pursuant to paragraph 15 of Exhibit A. 
WHEREFORE the Plaintiff prays for a judgement against the 
Defendants jointly and separately as follows: 
1. For an accounting, 
2. For a judgement for any over payment of maintenance, 
3. For prejudgment and post judgement interest at the highest 
legal rate. 
4. For reasonable attorney fees, 
5. For cost of court herein, 
6. For such other relief as the court may deem just and 
proper. 
IV. 
FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION 
BREACH OF CONTRACT AGAINST BOTH DEFENDANTS 
25. The Plaintiff reallege the allegations of paragraph one 
through nine of the first cause of action and paragraph ten though 
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seventeen for the second cause of action and paragraphs eighteen 
though twenty four of the third cause of action. 
26. The Plaintiff has been deprived of his fair right of 
utilization of the Summerset Cruiser houseboat for at least three 
weeks per year for the three years during which they have held an 
ownership interest the craft. 
27. The reasonable weekly value of one weeks use is Eighteen 
hundred dollars ($1800.00) for a total of nine lost weeks of 
utilization for a total of damages for loss of use in the amount of 
Sixteen Thousand Two Hundred Dollars ($16,200.00) 
28. The Plaintiff is entitled to reasonable attorney fees 
pursuant to paragraph 15 of the Exhibit A. 
WHEREFORE the Plaintiff prays for judgement against the 
Defendant as follows: 
1. For Sixteen Thousand Two Hundred Dollars, 
2. For reasonable attorney fees, 
3. For prejudgment and post judgement interest at the highest 
legal rate. 
4. For costs of court herein, 
5. For such other relief as the court deems just and proper. 
V. 
FIFTH CAUSE OF ACTION 
FRAUD AGAINST KEN MADSEN ONLY 
29. The Plaintiff reallege the allegations of paragraph one 
through nine of the first cause of action, paragraphs ten through 
seventeen of the second cause of action, paragraphs eighteen 
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through twenty four of the third cause of action and paragraphs 
twenty five through twenty eight of the fourth cause of action, 
30. The Defendant Ken Madsen made a material 
misrepresentation in order to induce the Plaintiff to enter into 
the contract which is Exhibit A attached hereto and incorporated 
herein by reference. 
31. The material misrepresentation is that the boat at the 
time of the sale was available for unlimited utilization and would 
certainly be available for a minimum of six weeks each summer. The 
representation made that the existing condition of ownership, 
storage, utilization and condition of the craft would allow such 
utilization and there would be no changes and no changes were 
intended that would preclude such utilization. A second 
misrepresentation was that at the time of the execution of the 
contract the boat would be transferred to the name of a partnership 
to include the Plaintiff as listed owner as a member of the 
partnership. 
32. The boat was not available for utilization. There was no 
present intent on the part of the Defendant to create a partnership 
and list the title in the Plaintiff's name. 
33. The boat has not been available since the date of the 
contract for six weeks and or unlimited utilization and the 
transfer of the title has never occurred and there was never 
utilization availability and there was never an intent to convey 
the title but rather an intent not to convey the title. 
34. The misrepresentations were made regarding material 
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existing current facts. 
35. The Plaintiff relied upon the misrepresentations. 
36. The Plaintiff's reliance was reasonable. 
37. But for the misrepresentations the Plaintiff would not 
have entered into the contract. 
38. As a result of the misrepresentations the Plaintiff has 
been damaged in the amount of Sixteen Thousand Two Hundred Dollars 
($16,200.00) as set forth in the preceding cause of action. 
39. The action of the Defendant, Kenneth Madsen were 
malicious, wrongful, intentional and the Plaintiff is entitled to 
punitive damages in the amount of Eight Thousand Dollars 
($8,000.00) . 
40. The Plaintiff is entitle to attorney fees as is specified 
in the contract. 
WHEREFORE the Plaintiff prays for judgment against the 
Defendant, Kenneth Madsen as follows: 
1. For Sixteen Thousand Two Hundred Dollars ($16,200.00) as 
actual damages. 
2. For Eight Thousand Dollars ($8,000.00) punitive damages. 
3. For reasonable attorney fees, 
4. For prejudgment and post judgement interest at the highest 
legal rate. 
5. For cost of court herein. 
6. For such other relief as the court may deem just and 
proper. 
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DATED this frw day of ^'y 1993. 
ADAMSON & SUMMERHAYS 
Lowell V. Summerha^s 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
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